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Prolegomena 
The earth being unformed and void, with darkness over the surface of the deep, and a wind 
from God was sweeping over the water – 
God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was light. 
God saw that the light was good, and God separated the light from the darkness. 
[Genesis 1:2-4] 
Introduction 
Born to an aristocratic family in 1740, Donatien Alphonse François, the Marquis de Sade, is 
one of the most controversial and infamous writers that has ever lived. Banned across Europe 
for over a hundred years after his death in 1814, Sade is synonymous with a mind fixed on 
the breaking of prohibitions. His philosophy sought to outrage the morally and sexually 
repressive laws of Christianity. Ironically and predictably for a man consumed with proving 
the fallacy of crime, Sade was considered a criminal and spent half of his adult life in prisons. 
Sade was arrested for various sexual misdemeanours throughout his lifetime, bridging either 
side of the French revolution; he received lettres de cachet from both Louis XVI and 
Napoleon Bonaparte. The most serious incident with the law occurred in 1772 when Sade 
drugged a group of women with Spanish fly at an orgy, nearly leading to the death of a young 
girl. He narrowly escaped the gallows for “poisoning” and a further charge of “sodomy” with 
his valet, Latour.
1
  
In prison, Sade spent much of his time writing in intense isolation and the vast body of his 
writings can be largely read as prison diaries. If Sade was less insolent and keen to ‘reoffend’ 
upon his numerous releases, it seems that he would have been imprisoned less, but, having 
been convicted of such unmentionable ‘crimes’ as “sodomy”, his reputation was ruined. 
Indeed, the French nation and the Sade family would not reclaim the ‘divine’ Marquis until 
the mid-twentieth century. And so there is something at once both pitiful and noble about a 
man who, having had the world turn his back on him, endeavours to create the most powerful 
fiction possible. Sade’s fictive self declares the divine commandments of a supreme master, 
demanding unlimited power and boundless rights. The prestige and glamour he ascribes to his 
characters are betrayed by the letters to his wife. Here, he speaks of a “cruel life”, restricted 
to one sheet of paper per day, a small window of sunlight and limited exercise.
2
 Given this 
                                                          
1
 R. Hayman, De Sade: A Critical Biography, Constable: London, 1978, pp. 58-59 
2
 See: D. A. F. Sade, Letters from Prison, trans. Richard Seaver, Arcade Publishing: New York, 1999 
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evident dichotomy between Sade’s material environment and his fictive self, it is no surprise 
that his philosophy focuses’ on binaries and their fragile boundaries: crime and law, taboo 
and transgression, master and slave, abuser and victim.  
However, this thesis is not concerned with Sade as the maltreated prisoner, but the monstrous 
figure presented in his masterwork, The 120 Days of Sodom, or the School of Libertinism 
(Les 120 journées de Sodome ou l’école du libertinage [1785]). We will be discussing the 
extremes of political violence and the theoretical attempts to justify absolute power. In the 
ensuing pages, we shall find Sade subjecting his citizens to acts that we should find 
abhorrent: torture, rape, paedophilia, to name but a few of his ostensibly endless “passions” 
(passions). Sade’s sentences are long and overdrawn, these acts are described gleefully and 
exponentially. For within Sade’s world, more is always more. Torturing an entire “society” 
(société) is a greater pleasure than the miseries of one individual. Sade’s lists of “crimes” 
(crimes), methodically drawn in the seclusion of his cell, are intentionally inexhaustible; he 
exhibits a consciousness which is continually thwarted by itself. Such is the psycho-sexual 
pathology of Sadism: committing crimes, transgressing taboos, is the height of sexual desire – 
the bigger the crime, the higher the pleasure. Sade presents a philosophy of negation, a norm 
grounded in crime, law formed from transgression. This parodistic imperative, ‘I ought not be 
obligated’, ensures that all is permitted. Sade declares: “I am alone here, I am at the world’s 
end, withheld from every gaze, here no one can reach me, there is no creature that can come 
near to where I am; no limits, hence, no barriers; I am free (Je suis seul ici, j’y suis au bout du 
monde, soustrait à tous les yeux et sans qu’il puisse devenir possible, à aucune créature 
d’arriver à moi; plus de freins, plus de barrières).”3 
Sadean scholars who attempt to moralise this obsession with the forbidden, always come 
short of providing a complete reading. Scholars must take into account Sade’s ambivalence 
and resistance to fixed moral schemes. Neither Jacobin, nor feudalist of the ancien régime, 
Sade cannot properly belong to the conventional partition between the right and left-wing. On 
the left-wing ‘liberal’ Sade, whether in a “feminist”4, “gay”5 or “queer”6 reading, gender 
egalitarianism is analysed in terms of Sade’s occupation of an intermediary space between 
                                                          
3
 D. A. F. Sade, The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom, trans., Austryn Wainhouse and Richard Seaver, 
Arrow Books, 1990, p. 412 
4
 See: J. Gallop, ‘The Liberated Woman: Sade’s philosophy in the Boudoir’, Narrative, 2005, Vol.13(2), pp.89-
104 
5
 See: G. Hekma, ‘Review Essay: Rewriting the History of Sade’, Journal of the History of Sexuality, vol.1(1), 
1990, pp.131-136 
6
 See: W. Edmiston, Sade: queer theorist, Voltaire Foundation: Oxford, 2013 
Samuel Ernest Harrington  
20, 000 [17, 973] 
5 
 
the traditional hierarchical binaries of sex and gender (such as the preferring of non-
reproductive and passive ‘sodomite’ sex). Yet the ‘liberal’ interpretation is undermined by 
Sade’s utter devotion to masculine sexual prowess, believing women to be the sexual servants 
of men.
7
 Conversely, if we see in Sade a radical right-wing conservative in the mould of his 
contemporary Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), glorifying the absolute monarchy of the first 
estate,
8
 this interpretation is destabilised by the dry irony which characterises his critique of 
the feudal system. The four law-makers of The 120 Days are overtly representative of those 
who profited from the excessive corruption of the ancien régime. Enamoured with “evil” (le 
mal), they wallow in depravity and vice, openly declaring that they impose all law, but obey 
none: “Thus, nothing but the law stands in my way, but I defy the law, my gold and my 
prestige keep me well beyond reach of those vulgar instruments of repression which should 
be employed only upon the common sort (Je n'ai donc contre moi que les lois, mais je les 
brave; mon or et mon crédit me mettent au-dessus de ces fléaux vulgaires qui ne doivent 
frapper que le peuple).”9  
The political dimension of Sade’s 120 Days, at the heart of this thesis, is found in the 
sovereign’s capacity to publically summon any citizen and compel them to satisfy their own 
needs.
10
 As the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan notes, the sadistic will to dominate rejects any 
of the habitual hallmarks which typify an ethic: otherness, togetherness, mutual benefit or 
exchange and so on. Morality requires reciprocity, equivalent ethical relations between 
peoples.
11
 It is only because no human being can be the property of another – “every other is 
wholly other” (tout autre est tout autre)12 – that moral experience is possible. By contrast, 
Sade presents the paradigm of exclusion. The habitual subject of morality (the individual ‘I’ 
in its relation to humanity as an equal whole of ‘others’) is displaced and relocated solely into 
the other, into him. Sade demands that we submit to his jouissance, commanding the right 
over our body, without any limit stopping him. Particularly in The 120 Days, human relations 
are not conceived of in any other terms than power and domination; the subjects of Silling are 
considered “victims” (victimes) not partners. Sade’s imperative begins from this reduction to 
victimhood: the subjects are already dead to the world, servants to the whims of power, 
                                                          
7
 See: S. E. Harrington, {REVIEW}, ‘W. Edmiston, Sade: queer theorist’, International Network for Sexual 
Ethics and Politics, Vol. 3(1), (forthcoming, 2016) 
8
 G. Minois, Histoire de L’Enfer, Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1994 p. 123  
9
 Sade (1990), p. 199 
10
 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford University 
Press, 1998, p. 79 
11
 J. Lacan, ‘Kant avec Sade’, Critique, 1963, Vol. 191, pp. 291-313 
12
 J. Derrida, Donner la Mort, Editions Galilee, 1999 
Samuel Ernest Harrington  
20, 000 [17, 973] 
6 
 
which seeks after nothing but to sustain itself. To deny and negate constitutes the 
manifestation of Sade’s political power, separating and distinguishing between those who get 
to live a legally viable life, and those who can justifiably be conquered. Thus, the stripping 
away of juridical rights is the sadistic political act par excellence. 
Sade speaks to the politics of the tyrant and the despot, who, drunk on success, invariably 
seek the destruction and degradation of their own people. A common dialectical turn in late-
eighteenth, early-nineteenth century literature, evident in both Blake
13
 and Hegel,
14
 is that he 
who seeks to dominate becomes shackled to the very object he seeks to enslave and, indeed, 
Sade’s sovereigns are nothing without victims. Yet as the French philosopher Georges 
Bataille makes clear, the language of The 120 Days inverts this dialectical relation between 
master and slave. Sade’s originality lies in his deification of the torturer, whilst employing the 
violent language of the victim. Banally justifying authority, the tormentor cannot use the 
language of the violence he wields. Following the rescindment of legal rights for the 
detainees at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, the British and United States military referred to 
their torture policies as “standard operating procedures”, involving “stress positions”.15 The 
Nazis did not discuss an ‘extermination’ or ‘killing’, let alone a ‘holocaust’, only 
“evacuation” (Aussiedlung) and “special treatment” (Sonderbehandlung),16 expressing “the 
objects of bureaucratic operation…in purely technical, ethically neutral terms.”17 It is the 
victim who provides the details of victimhood – who we require to ‘speak out’. Sade’s 
aesthetic project in The 120 Days is to reveal the cyclical nature of power and domination, 
the brittle limits cordoning legal boundaries. Pedantically arranged and outlined, Sade 
intended the novel to be his masterpiece. As Bataille continues, Sade’s performative gesture 
is to provide a counter-enlightenment narrative, uncovering the crimes of the powerful in the 
language of the repressed: “[Sade] invented it in the Bastille when he wrote the Cent Vingt 
Journées...the man punished for a reason he believes unfair cannot resign himself to silence – 
silence would imply acceptance...The Marquis de Sade...had to give his rebellion a voice.”18 
 
 
                                                          
13
 W. Blake, The Visions of the Daughters of Albion [1793], J.M. Dent and Sons, 1932 
14
 G. W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977 
15
 P. Gourevitch and E. Morris, Standard Operating Procedure: A War Story, Picador, 2008 
16
 H, Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, Viking Press: New York, 1964, p. 43 
17
 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 102 
18
 G. Bataille, Death and Sensuality¸ trans. Mary Dalwood, Walker and Company: New York, 1962, p. 190 
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Conceptual Framework 
This thesis intends to use The 120 Days of Sodom to contribute to a reflection upon 
sovereignty in political philosophy. The overarching aim is to determine the extent to which 
Sade’s conception of transgression in The 120 Days can illumine the problem of sovereignty. 
The thesis will argue that this novel presents a sustained revelation of a particular paradox 
evident in sovereign theory. This paradox is explicitly dealt with in the political philosophy 
of the German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). It is the contention of this thesis that the 
political philosophy of de Sade, as outlined in The 120 Days, contains precise affinities with 
Schmitt’s theory of the exception. Like Schmitt, Sade articulates the transgressive capacity of 
sovereign power. Sovereignty rests upon mere attribution, not moral or normative 
considerations. Sovereign authority, once attributed, is legitimate because the sovereign has 
the power and authority to decide that it is legitimate. This ‘decision’ creates our paradox: the 
transcendent preserver of law is ultimately not bound to the law that is ordered. 
Consequently, the sovereign power alone is capable of legitimate transgression, going beyond 
the normal order with the aim of sustaining the normal order. Any suspension of law on 
behalf of the sovereign is an act of transgression. In the suspension of law, the sovereign 
transgresses the limits of the juridical order, with the aim of sustaining the legal order, hence 
the paradox.  
The word ‘sovereignty’ has its origins in medieval French, soverain – meaning “the supreme 
ruler”.19 This formulation is itself derivative of the Latin super, meaning “over, above and 
beyond”, and rego, meaning “to direct, guide and govern”. 20  Sovereignty refers to a 
conception of power in terms of authority. Since there have been a great many different 
societies, with varying power structures, sovereignty is a challenging term. It became widely 
used in the early-modern era as a means of navigating the relations between the church and 
the newly-formed European nation states, developing into a fundamental principle of 
contemporary international law. In philosophy of law and political philosophy, the highest 
ruling authority of a given population is understood by the word ‘sovereignty’. The term is 
used both as an adjective (i.e. to describe or characterise that which has supreme authority, 
like ‘the sovereign Queen’) and as a noun (i.e. to denote that person, body or state which 
possesses the highest power, ‘the Queen is the sovereign). We refer to the leader of a territory 
                                                          
19
 A. Rey, Dictionnaire Historique de la Langue Français, Le Robert, 2010, p. 1267 
20
 M. de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages, Brill: Leiden, 2008, pp. 517, 
600 
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as the ‘sovereign’, with the area governed denoting the domain of their ‘sovereignty’. The 
sovereign is the creator and gatekeeper of the law, maintaining supreme power and ultimate 
right. The sovereign has the right to make law, revise laws already made and repeal laws 
considered superfluous. As F. H. Hinsley details in his seminal analysis of the term, in order 
to enact these laws, the sovereign wields the full force of the given territory: “…the idea that 
there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community…and [crucially] no 
final and absolute authority exists elsewhere.”21 This authority functions at two levels: firstly, 
the sovereign has the right to enforce law internally and secondly, the sovereign represents 
said territory when engaged with other sovereign territories externally. The state has the right 
to rule as its own sovereign body, without outside interference. This sovereignty enables the 
state to enter into relations with other bodies, whom, in turn, possess their own sovereign 
power.  
According to Schmitt, all the significant concepts of the theory of the state, including 
sovereignty, are “secularised theological concepts” (säkularisierte theologische Begriffe).22 
As Kathleen Davis clarifies in her recent study on the problem of sovereignty, for Schmitt, 
the process of secularisation “does not refer to the narrative of Europe’s extrication from 
theological constraints; it refers rather to the transferral of theological forms to the politics of 
an ostensibly ‘secular’ context”.23 Indeed, the relation of law-making to divinity dates as far 
back as recorded human civilization: the “lawmakers” of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia 
were said to be the human embodiment of the divine realm, for example.
24
 However, we are 
not concerned with the many complications deriving from the terms ‘law’ and ‘divinity’, but 
a particular contradiction intrinsic to political authority: the transcendent preserver of law is 
ultimately unbound to the law that is ordered. Schmitt’s central claim is that the sovereign’s 
exceptional authority is a “secularised” (säkularisierte) conception of the transcendent Judea-
Christian God: “the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver”.25 The capacity to 
legitimately transgress a juridical framework is really a secularised conception of the biblical 
“miracle” (Wunder). Schmitt defines the miracle as a “transgression of nature through an 
exception brought about by direct intervention.”26 Demanding the authority to suspend the 
                                                          
21
 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, Cambridge, 1986, p. 3 (my addendum) 
22
 C. Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab, University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 36 
23
 K. Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, p. 14 
24
 R. Brague, Law of God, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, University of Chicago Press, 2007, pp. 15-17 
25
 Schmitt (2005), p. 36 
26
 Ibid., p. 36 
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law at will is to compare oneself to God.  It is in this event, where force is enacted, law 
suspended, that the originary power of sovereign authority is revealed. 
The definition of political authority in terms of the power to go beyond the normal order 
therefore,  has its ‘pre-theological’ roots in the biblical God’s ‘miraculous’ capacities.27 The 
biblical God portends all the prestigious characterises of sovereign authority. He is 
necessarily mysterious and inscrutable, demanding nothing but absolute submission and 
obedience: “God’s essence is not knowable”, “one cannot see His face and live” [Exodus 
33:20]. The power of the biblical God is sourced in His capacity to perform miracles, 
distinguishing “the children of Israel” [Exodus 19:6] from “the gentile” [Genesis 10:5]. The 
biblical God’s miraculous revelations interrupt the normal order of things, changing “rock 
into a pool of water”, or a “granite cliff into a fountain” [Psalm 114]. This authority 
transcends any evaluative judgments, commanding unconditional humility and servitude.  
However, the problem of sovereignty emerges as a fully-formed intentional paradox in the 
theology of Augustine and the early middle ages, reaching its height in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. Here, as Davis maintains,  the “paradox” of sovereign power is 
“explicitly” “recognised”, but not problematised: “…typically expressed in the imperial 
formula that the prince is simultaneously lawmaker and unbound by law.”28 Augustine of 
Hippo (354-430) proclaimed that God, qua the transcendent preserver of good and evil – the 
moral “order” (ordo) – He is beyond such moral evaluations. God, in the capacity of 
determining good and evil, exists “outside” (extra) “corruption” (corruptio) and “evil” 
(malum).
29
 Beyond time, in “eternity” (aeternum), law cannot be forced upon Him.30 God has 
the authority to go beyond normative prescriptions, demanding actions “contrary to the 
custom or agreement of a group of people” (contra societatem civitatis eius obtemperatur).31 
Humanity unquestioningly obeys God, they “must serve without hesitation” (sine dubitatione 
serviendum est).
32
 In the middle ages, Christian sovereign authorities, as the direct 
                                                          
27
 Interestingly, Aristotle inquires as to who ought to be “the lord” (τὸ κύριον) of the “politeia” (πολιτεία) 
[Politics, Book III. Ch. vi. 1, trans. Benjamin Jowett]. This term, “τὸ κύριον”, which is often  
translated as “sovereign” (by Jowett, for example), is continually used by both Philo (for instance, On 
Drunkenness [372], ch. xxvi, 102) and the Greek New Testament (as in: and said to Him, My 
Lord [κύριός] John 20:28) to reference the Judeo-Christian God. 
28
 Davis (2008), p. 14 
29
 Augustine, Confessions [397-400 CE], Book VII, 13.(19), trans. Carolyn J. B. Hammond, Loeb: Harvard, 
2014, p. 333 
30
 F. Suarez, Tractatus de Legibus ac deo Legislatore [1612]: Selections from three works, trans. James Brown 
Scott, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944, p. 144 
31
 Augustine (2014), p. 119 
32
 Ibid., 
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interlocutors of God’s word, held the same exceptional status. Sovereignty was a power 
attributed to God and His human representatives, and doubting sovereign authority is a 
nonsensical proposition to a society with absolute faith. A legislative action is not “binding” 
merely “because it is good”, it is “binding” because the sovereign “wills it” and “what the 
prince wills has the force of law” (quod principi placet vigorem legis habet).33 The German-
Jewish political philosopher Leo Strauss – a contemporary and correspondent of Schmitt – 
continues: “Originally, the questions concerning the first things and the right way are 
answered before they are raised. They are answered by authority
34…there is no biblical word 
for doubt.”35  
The problem of the legitimacy of sovereign authority – a theologico-political problem – 
arises in the early-modern period (around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) because 
this is the first time that divine sovereign authority is doubted. Indeed, in this context, it is 
“religious disappointment” which provokes the “problem of meaning”.36 There are many 
reasons as to why this doubt occurs: the separation of church and state, the historical 
approach to sacred texts, the assertion of the “literal incredibility”37 of miracles38 and so on, 
but none of these purported ‘causes’ are our concern here. What is crucial for this thesis is 
that in a modern or secular context, the paradox of sovereign power is explicitly understood 
as a problem. Correspondingly, political authority can no longer claim legitimacy on purely 
sacred grounds – it must be justified. From Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes to our present 
day, the sovereign authority’s suspension of law is justified on the grounds that it protects the 
state. The transgressive capacity of sovereign power is justified by recourse to the banner of 
“security”.  
Schmitt explains: “The starting point of Hobbes’ construction of the state is fear of the state 
of nature”.39 At the basis of political authority is not “divine right”, but the “security of the 
civil, stately (staatlichen) condition”.40 Without the existence of the civitas, there is naught 
                                                          
33
 Augustinus Triumphus, Summa de potestate ecclesiastica [1326], cit., M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty 
in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, 1963, p. 154 
34
 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, University of Chicago Press, 1965, p. 84 
35
 L. Strauss, ‘Jerusalem and Athens’, Commentary, 1967, pp. 45-57, p. 47 
36
 S. Critchley, Very Little…Almost Nothing, Routledge: New York, 1997, p. 2 
37
 Ibid., p. 3 
38
 B. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise [1670]: Chapter 6 – ‘On Miracles’: “…a miracle, whether contrary 
to nature or above nature, is a plain absurdity.” (p. 87, trans. Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012)  
39
 C. Schmitt, The Leviathan in the state theory of Thomas Hobbes, trans. George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein, 
The University of Chicago Press, 2008, p. 31 
40
 Ibid., pp. 91-92 
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but the infamous “war of all against all” (bellum omnium contra omnes).41 Given this mutual 
and irrefutable antagonism, human beings seek protection from an indivisible and unified 
sovereign. Terror dictates this subservience to the highest power: the state is constituted by 
the concrete, existing success of actual fortification. Vital for Schmitt is that Hobbes’ 
“Leviathan”42 is “the mortal God”43: “Because state power is supreme, it possesses divine 
character. But its omnipotence is not at all divinely derived: It is a product of human work 
and comes about because of a ‘covenant’ entered into by man…The state as order and 
commonwealth is the product of human reason and human inventiveness and comes about by 
virtue of the covenant.”44 The “secularised” (säkularisierte) appearance of miracles emerges 
in the sovereign’s ability to transcend moral considerations – to transgress normative 
boundaries – legitimised on the assumption that it benefits the people as a whole. Hobbes 
writes that: “in a Civil State, where the Right of life, and death, and of all corporal 
punishment is with the Supreme (i.e. the sovereign); that same Right of killing cannot be 
granted to any private person.”45   
One of the core aims of this thesis therefore, is to draw out the underlying affinity between 
political power and transgression, sourced in the limits connecting legitimacy to criminality. 
We will explore how sovereign power, and thus law-making as such, is always already 
involved in transgression: a figure outside the law, who determines the law, but is ultimately 
not bound to any of its dictums. Transgression is an act that goes against law, either to 
improve it or to violate it, irrespectively. It implies a normal code of conduct which upholds 
certain acts as taboo. The taboo denotes respect for the law. The transgressive desire involves 
the limit and the law, which it then seeks to overcome or violate. Transgression need not be 
good, or even divine. Any violation of law, in crime, can be seen as a transgression just as 
well. As Bataille defines, taboo presents a “negative definition” of that which cannot be 
violated.
46
 Prohibitions sustain the law by delimiting its boundaries. Like the Hegelian 
Aufhebung, the act of transgression suspends and sublates the taboo without eliminating it – 
transgression transcends the taboo without suppressing it. The possibility and periodic ritual 
of transgressing these limits creates social cohesion. Which is to say, the juridical order itself 
                                                          
41
 T. Hobbes, De Cive [1642], Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 49 
42
 The Hobbesian term for the sovereign power. 
43
 T. Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 114 
44
 Schmitt (2008), p. 33 
45
 Hobbes (1987), p. 59 
46
 G. Bataille, Taboo and Transgression: Georges Bataille’s Essential Writings, ed. Michael Richardson, Sage 
Publication, 1998, p. 58 
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“depends on limited acts of transgression”.47 Truly, the capacity to legitimately transgress is 
the mark of sovereign power.  
This thesis will focus on The 120 Days of Sodom as a philosophical novel about the 
possibility of absolute sovereignty. This study will demonstrate that Sade’s novel accelerates 
and exhausts the problem of sovereignty, creating a state of infinite transgression of 
boundaries and limits (a prospect only possible in art). This interpretation concentrates on the 
novel’s extra-textual qualities. Key for this reading is that the introduction and the first part 
(the first thirty days) are the only “parts” (partis) of The 120 Days that Sade finished, with the 
remaining three parts – overtly a “plan” (plan)48 – surviving in a fragmentary style. Sade left 
notes to himself at the end of every section concerning “mistakes I have made” (omissions 
que j’ai faites). Parts two and three are peppered with Sade’s own running commentary, 
adding meticulous details, correcting frequent inconsistencies resulting from the 
overabundant descriptions. The final “notes” (supplément) following part four contain an 
important memo Sade left to himself: “And throughout the whole, introduce a quantity of 
moral dissertation and diatribe” (Et dans le total, mêlez surtout de la morale).49 It is this “I” 
(je) which we are seeking to address: Sade’s fictive self and the “moral dissertation” he 
desired to construct. We will thus pay particular attention to the first section in which the 
setting and the law are established. The setting of Sade’s texts are commonly misinterpreted 
by scholars.
50
 We shall see that Sade’s novel is set at a specific time, based on the decline of 
a certain regime who followed a particular reading of sovereignty. The 120 Days is set at the 
decline of Louis XIV’s reign (1638-1715) – nicknamed “the sun king” (le Roi-Soleil), his 
absolute monarchy was dominated by the political philosophy of Jean Bodin (1530-1596).  
This paper will argue that Sade’s destructive logic is established in the first “part” of The 120 
Days, and that it is only then allowed to accelerate and disentangle towards its conclusion. 
This is in opposition to many scholars,
51
 arguing that it is the denial of fraternité which is 
central to Sade’s thought. The four sovereigns of The 120 Days of Sodom possess “identical 
moral traits”. 52  Their fundamental dictum reads: the greater the crime, the greater the 
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transgression of law, the greater the power and the higher the pleasure. The sovereigns’ sole 
desire is to destroy restrictions: “My prick positively jumps when I do evil (faire le mal), in 
evil I discover precisely what is needed to stimulate in me all of pleasure’s sensations, and I 
perform evil for that reason, for it alone, without any ulterior motive (et sans autre intérêt que 
lui seul).”53 The sacred figure that Sade designs seeks to negate both religion and nature; 
there is no God or sin in Sade’s universe, crime is a fantasy of the weak and enslaved. Sade 
imagines a universe in which the exceptional status of the sovereign, inherent within the logic 
of the juridical order, is turned into a perpetually manifest law. To read Sade through Schmitt 
is to put The 120 Days into a theological history of political authority, uncovering the relation 
between politics and faith. The removal of God, the unchaining of the earth from its axis, 
reveals the void into which Sade descends. In the ‘real world’, the suspension of law sustains 
the juridical order, the transgression ultimately serving a practical purpose which is to uphold 
juridical normalcy. In Sade’s fictive space, however, he details no such bounds. The 120 
Days is a wildly destructive exercise; it imitates the justification of sovereign power found in 
the decision, to create creating a situation of infinite transgression of boundaries and limits. 
Sade forms an impossible universe wherein the exception becomes a normative principle. 
Like Kafka’s Process, the unravelling of the work’s fragments creates a hallucinatory 
dreadfulness in keeping with its contents. Sade accelerates the principle of sovereign power – 
the decisionistic aspect of the law – portraying seemingly endless attempts to sustain the 
“miracle” moment.   
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Chapter One: On Sovereignty 
 
What alarms you, O sea, that you fled?  
Jordan, that you ran backward? 
Tremble, O earth, at the presence of the LORD 
At the presence of the God of Jacob  
Who turned rock into a pool of water  
The flinty rock into a fountain 
[Psalms 114: 5, 7-8] 
Part I: Carl Schmitt and the problem of sovereignty  
The German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) gave the political concept of sovereignty 
renewed philosophical weight when he stated in his Political Theology (1922): “sovereign is 
he who decides on the state of the exception” (die Ausnahmezustand).54 Schmitt’s theory of 
sovereignty was and remains a controversial subject in political philosophy. As Kathleen 
Davis explains: “Schmitt has become famous for invoking his theory of the exception in 
1932, a decade after he wrote Political Theology, to argue for implementing the emergency 
powers of the Weimar Constitution…[which] ultimately helped clear the way for Hitler’s rise 
to power.”55 The claim of this thesis is that Sade’s novel, The 120 Days, extends Schmitt’s 
“theory of the exception”, accelerating and dismantling the paradox of sovereign power. 
Before we begin analysing the novel in the second chapter therefore, this first chapter of the 
thesis intends to unveil the problem of sovereignty as described by Schmitt’s legal and 
political philosophy.  
Schmitt states that “all law is situational”, meaning that laws are always physical (involved in 
force or violence, “a physical power”) and spatial (physically enacted in a ‘real’ place).56 
According to Schmitt, the “law” (Gesetz, Recht) is composed of two essential factors: the 
norm (Norm) and the decision (Entscheidung, Dezision). There is an agonistic relationship 
between these two constituents of the juridical order and sovereignty cannot exist without 
both elements. Schmitt’s claim is that the norm follows “the absolute beginning of the 
sovereign decision”, representing the concrete rules or statutes of a state: “The norm or rule 
does not create the order; on the contrary, only on the basis and in the framework of a given 
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order does it have a certain regulating function”.57 This defence of a decisionistic element of 
the juridical order is taken in opposition to what we now term ‘popular sovereignty’, 
represented in Schmitt’s time by the “liberal normativism”58 of the Rousseauian and Neo-
Kantian schools.
59
 The ‘liberal’ interpretation of sovereignty claims that the state is a 
reflection of the normative values of the people. Kant for example, defined a state as a “union 
of human beings under laws of right”. These laws are necessary inasmuch as they articulate 
the a priori idea of the state: “This idea serves as a norm for every actual union into a 
commonwealth (hence serves as a norm for its internal constitution).”60 Schmitt also find this 
hypothesis in Pindar’s famous equivocation of Nomos (νόμος) and Basileus (βασιλεύς), 
“custom, king over all” – nomos ho pantōn basileus.61  
Schmitt’s great contribution to the problem of sovereignty – which this thesis contends Sade 
echoes – is in demonstrating that the authority of sovereign power is not reliant upon any 
moral or normative considerations, but on the “decision”. Sovereign authority rests upon 
mere attribution; it is legitimate because the sovereign has the power to decide that it is 
legitimate. As intimated in the conceptual framework,
62
 the “decision” is a “secularised” 
(säkularisierte) theological concept. This ‘miraculous’ capacity lies at the origin of political 
power, an enigmatic force of law transcending moral judgements. Genesis 1 evidences the 
decision to create the biblical moral ordo, the “good”: “in the beginning, the earth was 
unformed and void”. The autonomous creativeness of God entails transforming the blank 
abyss into a significant whole. The first creation is the principle of division and separation, 
“light”. The ensuing creation days involve the separation of day from night, heaven from 
earth, woman from man and so on. God names that which is brought forth “good”. As Joseph 
Baer Soloveitchik explains: “When God engraved and carved out the world, he did not 
entirely eradicate the chaos and the void, the deep, the darkness, from the domain of His 
creation. Rather, he separated the complete, perfect existence from the forces of negation, 
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confusion, and turmoil and set up cosmic boundaries, eternal laws to keep them apart.”63 In 
Schmittian terms, the biblical creation story declares that the “decision” (God’s Word, “and 
God said”) is prior to any moral considerations (“the good”). Within biblical time, God 
“carves” the world out of “the deep” before the first prohibition forbidding knowledge of 
good and evil.  
Leo Strauss, in his 1932 commentary on Schmitt’s Concept of the Political (1927), expounds 
this theological ‘space’ prior to normative considerations: “the political cannot be evaluated 
at all, cannot be measured by an ideal; applied to the political, all ideals are nothing but 
‘abstractions’; all ‘normative prescriptions’ nothing but ‘fictions’. For the political is 
constituted by reference ‘to the real possibility of physical killing’ of men by men; and there 
is no rational purpose, no norm however correct, no program however exemplary, no social 
ideal however beautiful, no legitimacy or legality that can justify men’s killing one another 
for its own sake.”64 When sovereign power is allocated to the will of the people – as found 
for example, in the Romantic conception of sovereignty in Rousseau’s “general will” (la 
volonté générale) of the people defining “the common good” (le bien commun)65  – the 
decisionistic aspect of sovereignty is lost. For Schmitt, it is the indivisibility of sovereignty 
which creates the security and unity of the state.
66
 He writes: “Every general norm demands a 
normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to 
its regulations… [Yet] for a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he 
is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.”67  
The problem of sovereignty we are dealing with throughout this thesis therefore, concerns the 
logic and potential limits of contemporary secular sovereignty. The vital question for Schmitt 
is: to what extent is the sovereign bound to law? Key to Schmitt’s answer is that the 
sovereign is able to demonstrate the full extent of its powers in a “state of emergency” 
(Ausnahmezustand), meaning a situation of “extreme peril” which poses a serious threat to 
“the existence of the state”.68 George Schwab explains that “a state of exception includes any 
kind of severe economic or political disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary 
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measures…a state of emergency need not have an existing order as a reference point because 
necessitas non habet legem” – necessity has no law.69 In this event, the sovereign decides if it 
is necessary to “suspend” (suspendieren) “the law” (Gesetz, Recht). When confronted with a 
“state of emergency” (Ausnahmezustand), the rights of the sovereign are extended; the 
sovereign must go beyond the normative prescriptions of the law.
70
  Indeed, Schmitt argues, 
to adequately address the hypothetical needs of a given situation, the sovereign is ‘necessarily 
unlimited’ (notwendig unbegrenzt) in its ability to transgress and reaffirm the legal order. 71   
In a state of emergency, the sovereign suspends the norm with the intention of re-establishing 
the juridical order and the norm. The problem of sovereignty is that in this suspension, the 
sovereign paradoxically exists both inside and outside the juridical order. The form of the 
exception is thereby the presupposition of the normal sphere: “Inscribed as a presupposed 
exception in every rule that orders or forbids something (for example, in the rule that forbids 
homicide) is the pure and unsanctionable figure of the offence that, in the normal case, brings 
about the rule’s own transgression (in the same example, the killing of a man not as natural 
violence but as sovereign violence in the state of exception).”72 Sovereignty is paradoxical 
because it entails both the foundation of the legal order and the denial of the that order. The 
sovereign is the one who governs over the exception and is therefore situated both inside and 
outside the law.
73
 Schmitt formulates the paradoxical situation of the sovereign, as the 
transcendent source of law, being ultimately not bound to the law that is ordered. For this 
reason, sovereignty presents a sphere of indeterminacy, a “borderline idea” (Grenzbegriff).74  
According to Schmitt therefore, it is the state of the exception which legitimises sovereign 
power. It is precisely the sovereign’s lack of limitation, or, to say this differently, the capacity 
for the infinite, which constitutes sovereign authority. The sovereign is characterised 
“positively” as “the one above whom there is no power and who is thus free to decide and, 
negatively, as the one potentially excepted from every social norm and rule.”75 The existence 
of the sovereign ensures both the law’s subsistence and the capacity to transcend this 
delimitation – an open contradiction. For Schmitt, sovereignty is necessarily paradoxical. The 
existence of sovereign power sustains the legal order. Without sovereign authority, the state 
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would cease to exist. In order to uphold the law as such, authority must be situated within a 
single and indivisible source. Whilst this power is disseminated to a degree within civil 
institutions (the judge, the police officer, the banker, the educator etc.), this civil authority is 
only legitimate due to its sublimation under the higher authority of the state. In a state of 
emergency, when this overarching power is put under significant duress, all authority is 
relayed to the single sovereign figure. This figure may be one person (as in the days of Kings 
and Queens), or a group of people (such as a constitutional government). In any case, 
‘emergencies’ demand the transcendental capacities of the sovereign power. As the political 
philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write: “…sovereignty does not require that a 
single individual – an emperor, a Führer, or a Caesar – stand-alone above society and decide, 
but it does require that some unitary political subject – such as a party, or a nation – fulfil that 
role.”76 
Many of the texts written by the Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben argue that 
“the state of the exception” is the “dominant paradigm of government in contemporary 
politics”. 77  According to Agamben, in what we might tentatively call our ‘postmodern’ 
societies, comprising the latter half of the twentieth century until the present day, “there is a 
continuing trend in Western democracies” to replace the name “suspension of law” with “an 
unprecedented generalisation of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of 
government”. 78  This “state of emergency” – often “self-willed” as certain Nazi jurors 
proclaimed openly (gewollte Ausnahmezustand) – is a “technique of government”, appearing 
“as a threshold of indeterminancy between democracy and absolutism.”79 The plainest and 
most controversial “suspension” of law in recent memory was the USA’s “Military Order of 
November 13
th, 2001”. Here, Agamben claims, appears plainly “the original structure in 
which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension”.80 The order states 
that George W. Bush’s “authority” is “vested in me as President” and “in light of grave acts 
of terrorism and threats of terrorism” (i.e. the attacks on “September 14th, 2001”), he 
“proclaimed a national emergency”. With the intention of “protecting the United States and 
its citizens” Bush “finds” that “it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under 
this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of 
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criminal cases in the United States district courts.”81 Agamben writes that “What is new 
about President Bush’s order is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus 
producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being.”82 Like “the legal situation of the 
Jews in the Nazi Lager”, in a state of emergency, the sovereign’s exceptional (i.e. 
presidential) status, enables the reduction of life to a sphere of “indeterminacy”. 83  The 
‘miraculous’ capacities of sovereign authority make it possible to distinguish who leads a 
politically qualified life and who can justifiably be killed.  
However, as Agamben continues, is not that the state of the exception is particularly 
exceptional (that is to say, rare or uncommon) – on the contrary, it is that contemporary 
sovereign power is itself defined by the rule of the exception. The state of the exception is not 
a distinct type or kind of law (like the law of the sea); instead, since it is a suspension of the 
legal order itself, it circumscribes what is inside or outside the law.
84
 Sovereign power is 
defined by this “limit concept”. Rather than functioning within a normative legal framework, 
the decisionistic feature of sovereignty involves sovereign power being located in an area of 
“originary indistinction” between “violence and law”. 85  Agamben explains: “One of the 
paradoxes of the state of exception lies in the fact that in the state of exception, it is 
impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the law, such that what 
violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any remainder”.86 At the moment of 
transcendence, when law is suspended, the eventual goal is to re-establish and protect the 
normative order. In this momentary rupture, it is the force of law itself which bursts through 
the void. The result of this rupture between the sovereign and the juridical norm is force itself 
– unadorned violence. Agamben notes: “…the state of exception marks a threshold at which 
logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an 
enunciation without any real reference.”87  
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Summary 
The point of this first chapter has been to outline the problem of sovereignty we will be 
addressing throughout this thesis. Sovereignty is a term used to describe the highest ruling 
authority of a given population; we refer to the creator and gatekeeper of the law as ‘the 
sovereign’, with the area governed denoting the domain of their ‘sovereignty’. As drawn by 
Schmitt, the “law” is composed of two factors: the “decision”  and the “norm”. Sovereignty is 
not determined by moral or normative considerations, but on the capacity to ‘decide’: 
sovereign is he or she who decides on the exception. Sovereignty is thereby contradictory –  a 
“borderline idea” – because it involves both the institution of the juridical order and the 
denial of that order, a legitimate transgression. This first chapter has shown that the legal 
order is determined by this ‘miraculous’ ability: the capacity to decide the limits of a juridical 
framework, circumscribing what is inside or outside the law. Thus in every law lies the 
presupposed exception, an unsanctionable figure who openly brings about the law’s 
transgression. The conformation of the law occurs simultaneously with its violation. The 
sovereign’s exceptional status transforms criminal acts, such as murder, into an act of 
sovereign violence.  
The problem of sovereignty regards the potential limits of the sovereign power. Schmitt asks: 
to what extent is the sovereign bound to law? The answer is that in an “emergency”, when the 
state is under significant duress, the sovereign is hypothetically boundless in its ability to 
transgress and reaffirm the juridical order. Emergencies reveal the decision in its purest form. 
In an emergency, a violence grows without legal reference because “necessity has no law”. 
And so, the original indistinction between violence and law found in the “decision”, ensures 
that legitimacy is always grounded in a theological ‘space’ prior to normative considerations. 
This ‘void’ ultimately represents Schmitt’s process of “secularisation”, the transferral of God 
– the ‘unchaining of the earth from its axis’88 – revealing an abyss, “the deep” with which the 
law-maker “carves”. It is to Sade’s examination of this abyss and his impossible desire to 
dwell in it entirely, that we now turn. 
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Chapter Two: Transgression and The 120 Days of Sodom 
Now the inhabitants of Sodom were very wicked sinners against the LORD. 
The LORD rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah sulphurous fire from the LORD out 
of heaven. 
And, looking down toward Sodom and Gomorrah and all the lands of the Plain, he 
saw the smoke rising from the land like the smoke of a furnace 
 
[Genesis 13:13, 19: 24, 28] 
 
Part I: The setting of The 120 Days of Sodom 
The 120 Days of Sodom, or the School of Libertinism (Les 120 journées de Sodome ou l’école 
du libertinage) relates the story of a series of “orgies” (orgies) conducted over one hundred 
and twenty days by four “libertines” (libertins). The history of the novel – “the most impure 
tale ever told”89 – is as unusual as the text itself. Sade composed the story over a number of 
years and penned the novel as it stands today in a single month (from the 22
nd
 of October to 
the 28
th
 of November in 1785) whilst imprisoned at the Bastille in Paris.
90
 Upon the storming 
of the Bastille in 1789, the unfinished manuscript was stolen and Sade thought it eternally 
lost. Sade declared that he wept “tears of blood” at the loss of his magnum opus.91 The text 
was finally rediscovered over a century later by the German sexologist Iwan Bloch, 
eventually appearing “in three quarto volumes” between 1931 and 1935.92  
As a result of this strange history, coupled with the defiant transgressive nature of the text 
itself, modern scholarship is often characterised by the attempt to envisage Sade in terms of 
the twentieth century. These scholars claim that Sade was above all else a prophetic writer, 
signalling future developments in twentieth century Western thought. As outlined in the 
introduction, these parallels range across the political spectrum.
93
 Jane Gallop for example, 
argues that Sade ultimately promoted sexual equality. She states that The 120 Days of Sodom 
is not related to sovereignty, claiming that interpreters relocate sovereignty into Sade’s fiction 
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as a means of purporting their own theses.
94
 Yet, the completed introduction of The 120 Days 
of Sodom makes clear that Sade’s novel is set at a specific time, based on the decline of a 
certain regime, which promoted a particular form of sovereignty. In Sade scholarship, this 
historical and political rooting is often overlooked or misread.
95
 Therefore, the aim of this 
first section of the second chapter is to reclaim The 120 Days of Sodom for the context that 
Sade himself prescribed. 
Firstly, an outline of the text’s overall narrative: The 120 Days follows the actions of four 
sovereign law-makers and their “orgies” at “Silling Castle”: “The Duc de Blangis…his 
brother the Bishop…the celebrated Durcet and the Président de Curval”.96 Sade states that 
Curval and Durcet are both financiers in the sovereign courts – the Chambres des comptes.97 
A duke, de Blangis, is described as “colossally wealthy” after obtaining his inheritance from 
the age of “eighteen”.98 Whilst the Bishop, similarly rich from the family fortune, “brought 
about the cruel deaths of the two children whose sizable fortune was left in trust with him”.99 
Sade makes clear that in terms of their philosophical function within the novel, the only 
difference between the four characters are these material attributes: “Keep in mind the 
identical moral traits (En conservant absolument les mêmes traits moraux)…The same black 
soul, the same penchant for crime, the same contempt for religion, the same atheism (Même 
noirceur dans l'âme, même penchant au crime, même mépris pour la religion, même 
athéisme)”.100 The four characters organise for “victims” (victimes) to be brought to the 
castle, they claim absolute sovereignty over these inhabitants. Within the castle, the subjects 
are always obligated, the sovereigns are always legitimate. They establish a juridical order – 
“the statutes” (règlement) – which order their sexual bacchanals. Sade details the systematic 
rape, torture and eventual mass murder of the subjects. The novel ends with the sovereigns’ 
agreeing “to give a green ribbon to everyone whom they propose to take back with them to 
France; the green favour is bestowed, however, upon condition the recipient is willing to lend 
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a hand with the destruction of the other victims (de donner un ruban vert à tout ce qui doit 
être ramené en France, sous condition de prêter la main aux supplices du reste).”101  
 
The 120 Days of Sodom is set in France during the early-1710’s, at the close of King Louis 
XIV’s (1638-1715) reign: “The extensive wars wherewith Louis XIV was burdened during his 
reign,
102
 while draining the State’s treasury and exhausting the substance of the people, none 
the less contained the secret that led to the prosperity of a swarm of those bloodsuckers…The 
end of this so very sublime reign was perhaps one of the periods in the history of the French 
Empire when one saw the emergence of the greatest number of these mysterious fortunes 
whose origins are as obscure as the lust and debauchery that accompany them. It was towards 
the close of this period, and not long before the Regent
103
 sought, by means of the famous 
tribunal, which goes under the name of the Chambre de Justice,
104
 to flush this multitude of 
traffickers, that four of them conceived the idea for the singular revels whereof we are going 
to give an account.”105 In 1661, Louis took the decision to rule as his own first minister, an 
absolute sovereign in theory.
106
 As the absolute ruler of the French kingdom, “no individual 
or institution could challenge his supreme power”.107 In his memoirs he declared that his was 
a line of “hereditary kings who can boast that there isn’t either a better house, nor greater 
power, nor more absolute authority than theirs anywhere else in the world.”108   
Jean Bodin (1529-1596) had provided the philosophical justification for this “absolute 
authority” a century earlier with his Les six livres de la République (1576). Schmitt asserts 
that Bodin founded the philosophy of sovereignty for the modern and secular idea of the 
state.
109
 Bodin identified sovereignty, not with divine grace or supernatural intervention, but 
                                                          
101
 Sade (1990), p. 670 
102
 Louis XIV ‘engaged in five declared wars’, most notably the Dutch War (1672-78) and the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1701-14). J. A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV: 1667-1714, Longman, 1999, p. 6 
103
 During the minority of Louis XV, Philippe d'Orléans (1674-1723) was the Prince Regent of France from 
1715 to 1723. See: J. H. Shennan, Philippe Duke of Orleans, Thames & Hudson: London, 1979  
104
 The Chambre de Justice was a French high-court in operation from the middle-ages until the French 
Revolution of 1789. A tribunal was established by d'Orléans in 1716, curbing the actions of some members of 
the aristocracy who had grown rich off the spoils of King Louis XIV’s many wars; our four libertines are 
explicitly archetypical of this scandal. E. Goldner, ‘Corruption on Trial: Money, Power, and Punishment in 
France’s Chambre de Justice of 1716’, Varia: Crime, History and Society, Vol. 17(1), 2013, pp. 5-28. This is 
corroborated by Sade in Juliette (1797-1801); Dorval states that by the end of the rule of Louis XIV, 750 million 
had been paid in taxes, whilst only 250 million had been spent, thus there were 500 million livres unaccounted 
for. cit., I. Bloch, Marquis de Sade: His Life and Works, trans. James Bruce, Fredonia Books, 2002, p. 224    
105
 Sade (1990), p. 191 (my emphasis)  
106
 J. Swann, The State and Political Culture: Old Regime France, ed., William Doyle, Oxford, 2001, pp. 140, 
145 
107
 J. H. Shennan, Louis XIV, Methuen & Co., 1986, p. 5 
108
 Louis XIV cit., Shennan (1986), p. 8 (my emphasis) 
109
 C. Schmitt, On Dictatorship, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, Polity Press, 2004, p. 21 
Samuel Ernest Harrington  
20, 000 [17, 973] 
24 
 
with “power” (puissance), defining the sovereign as the one who has the unqualified right to 
command.
110
 Emphasising the indivisibility and inalienability of sovereignty, Bodin writes: 
“…there are none on earth, after God, greater than sovereign princes, which God establishes 
as His lieutenants to command the rest of mankind (Puisqu'il n'y a rien plus grand en terre, 
après Dieu, que les Princes souverains, et qu'ils sont établis de lui comme ses lieutenants, 
pour commander aux autres hommes).
111
 For Bodin, sovereignty is defined as “absolute and 
perpetual” (absolue et perpétuelle).112 The sovereign’s “power” (puissance) is absolute in that 
it contains the right to impose laws generally on all subjects regardless of their consent.
113
 
This absolutism means that the sovereign’s rule is supreme and unconditional: “for it is he 
who makes law for the subject (donner loi aux sujets), abrogates law already made, and 
amends obsolete law (casser ou anéantis les lois inutiles, pour en faire d’autres).”114 The 
sovereign’s power is perpetual in that only death can take away this authority: “A perpetual 
authority…must be understood to mean one that lasts for the lifetime of him who exercises 
it…he does so either by consent or by force and violence (force et violence).”115  
For Bodin, the encompassing attribute of sovereignty is “the power to make and unmake law” 
(La puissance de donner et casser la loi), “the power to make law binding on all subjects”.116 
The law may be established instantly by the sovereign; it draws its force from that which “has 
the right to bind all the rest.” 117  The law is then “promulgated” and “imposed” by the 
authorities, often “against the wishes of the subject”.118 Any binding restraints placed upon 
the supreme authority results in contradiction; it implies in some way that the subjects could 
be considered higher than the sovereign. Correspondingly, the attributes of sovereignty are 
unique to the sovereign, if any of these attributes were applicable to the subject, they could no 
longer be called attributes of sovereignty. The vital statement for this thesis is Bodin’s 
proclamation: “Just as Almighty God (Dieu) cannot create (ne peut faire) another God equal 
with Himself (pareil à lui), since He is infinite (entant qu’il est infini) and two infinities 
cannot co-exist, so the sovereign prince, who is the image of God (l’image de Dieu), cannot 
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make a subject equal with himself (un sujet égal à lui) without self-destruction (anéanti).”119 
Bodin concludes that the only limitations that can be placed on the absolute sovereign are the 
laws of “God” and “Nature” (la loi naturelle et divine): “…the sovereign…cannot in any way 
be subject to the commands of another”.120 By “natural law”, Bodin understands the eternal 
mathematical principles of “natural reason” (raison naturelle).121 By “divine law”, Bodin 
understands those normative acts which are “directly contrary to the law of God” 
(directement contraire à la loi de Dieu) such as “incest, adultery, parricide” (incestes, 
adultères, parricides) and so on.
122
 We shall see in the next section,
123
 Sade desires to 
transgress even these limits, surpassing not only the moral laws of Christianity, but also, and 
impossibly, concrete physical law. 
William Church explains that the French monarchy recognised the value of Les six livres de 
la République at once, Bodin was cited as a leading authority in seventeenth century France: 
“Bodin's conception of sovereignty had attributed to the ruler the combined authorities to 
make new law and to enforce its execution…when royal authority of that type was given a 
basis in divine authorization, the resulting idealization of the monarch's rule caused thinkers 
increasingly to regard the law made by the king as the earthly manifestation of God's will”.124 
Bodin’s philosophy was used to force independent communities under “the domination of an 
absolute sovereign whose word was to be law”; Louis XIV would express this power in a few 
words: “l'Etat! c'est moi”.125 The “manipulation” of Bodin’s theories was to “a large extent 
responsible” for “the despotic absolutism” of seventeenth century France.126 Indeed, as the 
French economist Henri Baudrillart wrote in 1853 on exactly this point: “Bodin is the 
philosopher of party politics, his book, considered from this point of view, is national politics 
scaled down and framed into a formal system (Bodin est le philosophe du parti politique, son 
livre, consideré à ce point de vue, n’est que la politique nationale réduite en corps et 
formulée en  système).”127 
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Sade was aware of the inherent crisis experienced within late-eighteenth century French 
aristocracy. His Aline et Valcour (1795), written around the same time as The 120 Days in the 
1780’s, prophesised of the coming revolution and the death of the old regime: “O Sainville, a 
great revolution is brewing in your country: the crimes of your sovereigns, their cruel 
exactions, their debauchery and ineptitude have left France; she is beyond despotism, she is 
on the verge of breaking her shackles (O Sainville, une grande révolution se prépare dans ta 
patrie; les crimes de vos souverains, leurs cruelles exactions, leurs débauches et leur ineptie 
ont lassé la France; elle est excédée du despotisme, elle est à la veille d'en briser les 
fers).”128 With the death of Louis XIV in 1715, the French aristocracy and the justification for 
absolute sovereignty were drastically altered – a new rhetoric emerged from the ancien 
régime. As Sade references on the opening page of The 120 Days,
129
 a new Chambre de 
Justice was commissioned in 1716 by the Regent Philippe d'Orléans, which aimed to “punish 
wrongdoings in the King’s finances”.130 Marc-René de Voyer de Paulmy d'Argenson (1694-
1757), le secrétaire d'État des Affaires étrangères for Louis XV, provided a more utilitarian 
justification for royal power. Here, royal authority is not simply imposed, it is a “centre for 
reform”: “The king’s authority would be insufficient to repress all the abuses…caused by the 
malice of men and the exigencies of the times, if, limiting itself to the maintenance of old 
laws, it could not establish new ones.”131  
Louis XIV became a common topos for the late-eighteenth century French writer, such as 
Sade, as well as those heralding the “massive rejection” of all that “absolute monarchy stood 
for”. 132  Of the same generation as Sade, Joseph Lavallée’s (1747-1816) Tableau 
philosophique du règne de Louis XIV, ou Louis jugé par un français libre (1791), declared: 
“Louis XIV…was born to the throne…from ferocious tyrants and barbarians! (Louis XIV...Il 
naquit pour le trône...des tirans féroces et barbares!)
133
 Similarly, Voltaire’s (1694-1778) 
Dictionnaire philosophique (1764), a ‘bestseller’ throughout France’s revolutionary period,134 
refers to the chambres when speaking of the ‘bankrupts’ (banqueroutiers) which plagued ‘the 
last years of Louis XIV’s reign’ (la dernière année du règne de Louis XIV): “…the fear of 
interrupting all commerce, obliged the government in 1715, 1716 [the chambre Sade also 
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refers to], 1718, 1722 and 1726 to suspend all proceedings against all those who were in a 
state of insolvency (la crainte de l'interruption de tout commerce, obligèrent le 
gouvernement, en 1715, 1716, 1718, 1721, 1722 et 1726, à faire suspendre toutes les 
procédures contre tous ceux qui étaient dans le cas de la faillite).”135  
In short, the 1710’s were an important time for late-eighteenth century France, signalling the 
swansong of Louis XIV’s  despotic absolutism. This absolute monarchy was frequently 
attacked by the French revolutionaries. We shall see in the next section, the relation of The 
120 Days to the reign of Louis XIV is more complex than Sade’s revolutionary colleagues. 
His four principle characters (a bishop, a duke, a financier and a magistrate) are explicitly 
archetypical of those who benefited from Louis XIV’s regime, representing “the four social 
groups responsible for maintaining law and order in France and, at least symbolically, for 
keeping Sade in jail.”136 Silling Castle is the set where Sade’s four characters, having grown 
rich from Louis XIV’s many wars, become ‘God-like’ law-makers. In this fictive space, they 
are absolute sovereigns, exercising unlimited power and right. We are told that they are yet to 
suffer any ramifications, but the chambre de justice of 1716 awaits, ruining financiers “whose 
fortunes had seemed secure only a few months before.”137 Sade establishes his story as the 
allegorical death-throes of the principle of absolute sovereignty. Sade’s four sovereigns, keen 
to enjoy their last grasp at complete freedom, organise a series of debauched bacchanals 
before the chambre “flushes out this multitude of traffickers” (de faire rendre gorge à cette 
multitude de traitants).
138
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Part Two: Sade’s Law: the destructive principle revealed 
This section of the paper will unveil Sade’s law as established in the first “part” (partie) of 
the novel. Firstly, we will be discussing the nature of Sade’s law – the “statutes” (règlement). 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis,
139
 the argument is that Sade’s destructive logic 
is established by these laws in the novel’s first “part”, and is then allowed to accelerate and 
disentangle in the final (unfinished) sections of the work. This will lead us to our second task, 
the possibility of infinite transgression. The sovereigns articulate a desire in constant 
frustration, destroying restrictions only to find a further impediment. As we have seen, Bodin 
states that the only restrictions to sovereign power are God and Nature; Sade seeks to 
transgress even these boundaries. We shall see that the establishment of the “statutes” 
(règlement), whilst initially requiring solidarity from the sovereign’s, ultimately unravels and 
is destroyed. In the end, each aspect of life at Silling Castle is highly controlled and 
maintained, leading to an ultimate abandonment as the text escalates. In Sade’s fictive world, 
we shall see that sovereign authority – unlike Bodin’s – is categorically perpetual and 
absolute. The totality of this authority, precisely because of its monstrous claim for 
universality, must be continually justified. The method of justification is formed from the 
suspension and transgression of law. The making of law, the transgressing and re-affirming 
of the juridical order, is the mark of sovereign power. Hence why it is the statutes themselves 
which create the crimes. This cyclical and destructive logic unfurls and stutters to a close in 
the novel’s later sections, and we are left with lists of the dead.  
The Statutes (règlement) 
The ‘statutes’(règlement) refer to a system of law maintained by the sovereigns at Silling 
Castle. The authority of this law is sourced in the transgressive “decision” as articulated by 
Schmitt in the preceding chapter. Like Schmitt, Sade saw sovereign law in terms of the 
“decision” rather than any moral or normative values. That is to say, prior to taking into 
account specific transgressive acts of an ostensibly ‘moral’ (i.e. Christian) nature, such as 
incest or “sodomy” (both of which Sade was particularly fond of describing as a pleasure 
sourced in “evil” [le mal]), we are dealing with the transgressive “decision” inscribed within 
the law itself. As we saw in the last chapter,
140
 central to Schmitt’s understanding of 
sovereign power is that “normative prescriptions” can only emerge as a result of the 
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“decision” (Entscheidung).141 Thus in Sade’s novel, the normative prescriptions of the law 
can only be formed after the sovereigns have “decided” to make themselves “exceptional”. It 
is this “exceptional” status which institutes and validates their juridical order.142  
Sade writes at the beginning of the work that the four sovereigns “decide” (décida) to form a 
“society” (société).143 This society is absolutely isolated from any other legislation: Silling is 
governed by its own internal law, allowing for no outside influence whatsoever, the walls are 
gated shut and the inhabitants are entirely enclosed within the château. Sade writes that: 
“…they barricaded themselves to such an extent there was no longer any trace left of where 
the exits had been.”144 The inhabitants of the castle are subdivided, each “class” (classe)145 is 
accorded a sexual function. As David Martyn writes, this organisation is characterised by a 
“numeric quality”: “…the orgies at Silling can be reduced to a number of geometrical 
constellations among the novel’s symmetrically arranged cast of characters.” 146  Sade is 
absolutely adverse to odd and prime numbers; the division and separation of life at Silling 
necessitates further control, hence the subdivisions into two, four, six and eight: a “harem” 
(sérial) of eight “young girls” (jeunes filles), a “harem” of eight “young boys” (jeunes 
garçons), eight male “fuckers” (fouteurs) aged between twenty and thirty years old, four 
“story-tellers” (historiennes) who inflame the sovereigns senses with descriptions of “every 
one of debauchery’s extravagances”,147 four “wives” (femmes) and, finally, the four sovereign 
husbands.  
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Silling Castle is a radical imagining of an internal police state. Foucault describes that the 
police state “entails precisely an objective or set of objectives that could be described as 
unlimited. Since for those who govern in the police state it is not only a matter of taking into 
account and taking charge of the activity of groups and orders, but also of taking charge of 
activity at the most detailed individual level.” 148  Indeed, the protection given to the 
sovereigns is completely fantastical, as if Sade were systematically eliminating any attempt 
by the reader to picture loopholes or viable escapes; within the castle walls, there are no 
delimitations to Sade’s sovereign authority. Silling Castle is built on “impossible” 
(impossible) foundations, a claim reiterated continually in the descriptions: “…a mountain 
almost as high as the Saint-Bernard and infinitely more difficult to ascend (on commençait à 
escalader une montagne presque aussi haute que le mont Saint-Bernard et d'un abord 
infiniment plus difficile)…so insurmountable that none but birds might overcome it (tellement 
insurmontable qu'il n'y avait plus que les oiseaux qui pussent la franchir)…after having 
climbed up the mountain, it is impossible, without great skill to go back down it (après avoir 
grimpé la montagne, il devient impossible de la redescendre).”149 The Duc “concludes” that 
“one would have to have wings or the devil’s powers to get out or in”.150 As the German-
language novelist and playwright Elias Cannetti observes in his work on mass psychology, 
Crowds and Power (1960), in this context, the “ruler” is analogous to the “paranoiac”: “…by 
the very nature of power…a sense of personal place or position is of cardinal 
importance…surrounding himself with soldiers and shutting himself in fortresses.”151 
 
According to Schmitt, with the “decision” to form a juridical order made, we can establish 
normative principles by examining the implied values of its law. Schmitt writes: “The 
ultimate juristic foundation of all legal validity and values [is] an act of will…a decision, 
which, as decision, actually creates ‘law’ (Recht)…that is, all ensuing norms and orders.”152 
In concrete terms, once the cast of characters is assembled and the echelons of the “society” 
established, the four sovereigns of The 120 Days proclaim a “code of law” (un code de lois). 
These binding “articles of government” are in operation for the entirety of the one hundred 
and twenty days. Sade writes that “…the four friends laboured over a code of laws which, as 
soon as it was brought to perfection and signed, was promulgated to those concerned (les 
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quatre amis travaillèrent à un code de lois, qui fut signé des chefs et promulgué aux sujets 
sitôt qu'on l'eût rédigé).”153 At Silling, it is the sovereigns who “form the light and create 
darkness” [Isaiah 45:7], on their “decision” is the normal juridical order formed. I will now 
describe and term three kinds of law here given.  
Firstly: ‘Obligations’. These “statutes” inform the reader as to when something must happen, 
providing a sort of schedule. Obligations relate to the organisation of “victims” internally 
within the castle. They are specific to their distribution – “the administration of bodies”154 as 
Foucault labels it – describing exactly when, how and to what extent the citizens of Silling 
will be manipulated. For example, it is scheduled that “punctually at six o’clock” every 
evening, the particular “storyteller” arranged for that day “shall begin her story”, the four 
sovereigns “may interrupt at any point and as frequently as they please”.155 As Agamben 
notes, the “organisation of life” at Silling Castle has a “totalitarian character”, Sade does “not 
spare” descriptions of “any aspect of physiological life (not even the digestive function, 
which is obsessively codified and publicised).”156  The sovereigns determine the victims’ 
consumption and excretions, no aspect of life at Silling, physiological, psychological or 
otherwise, exceeds their control. Indeed, in the entirety of the time that the sovereigns are 
awake – from arising at “ten o’clock in the morning”157 until “two in the morning” when the 
“orgies cease”158 – every bodily performance is rigorously accounted for.  
New obligations can be and are introduced at any point during the proceedings. The 
sovereigns hold the right to perform secular “miracles”, suspending and reaffirming the 
juridical order. Many of the new laws concern the digestive function. The sovereigns find 
pleasure in the consumption and sanctification of waste. The “private and common privies” 
are blasphemously “established in the chapel”, for example, to be emptied only by “the four 
wives”.159 Overarchingly, these ‘obligations’ legislate for absolute submission on the parts of 
the subjects. The sovereigns declare: “Should any subject in some way refuse anything 
demanded of him, even when incapacitated or when that thing is impossible, he shall be 
punished with the utmost severity; ‘tis for him to provide, for him to discover ways and 
means’(Tout sujet qui fera quelque refus de choses qui lui seront demandées, même en étant 
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dans l'impossibilité, sera très sévèrement puni: c'était à lui de prévoir et de prendre ses 
précautions).”160 
‘Prohibitions’ are our second kind of law. Some of the prohibitive laws forbid certain actions 
as such, applying to every rank of the “society”, whilst others apply only to the subjects. The 
penalty for transgressing these laws for the “victims” (i.e. non-sovereigns) is punishable by 
death and torture. With regards punishment to “the story-tellers” (historiennes), it shall be 
“one-half that of the children” and “the wives" shall “always be rewarded by punishment 
double that given the children”.161 The penalty attached to those few prohibitions which apply 
to the sovereigns is a fine of “ten thousand francs” (dix mille francs).162 For instance, the 
subjects are forbidden from engaging in unplanned sexual activity: “Any man taken flagrante 
delicto with a woman shall be punished by the loss of a limb when authorisation to enjoy this 
woman has not hitherto been granted him (Tout homme pris en flagrant délit avec une femme 
sera puni de la perte d'un membre, quand il n'aura pas reçu l'autorisation de jouir de cette 
femme).”163 Much of what is prohibited to all parties is religious faith. It is decreed that any 
“religious act on the part of the subjects” (acte de religion de la part d'un des sujets), 
sovereigns included, however “slight” (plus petit), will “be punished” (sera puni). 164 
Correspondingly, “the name of God” (Le nom de Dieu) shall not be “uttered save when 
accompanied by invectives or imprecations” (n'y sera jamais prononcé qu'accompagné 
d'invectives ou d'imprécations).
165
  
Thirdly and most interestingly for our purposes therefore, is the ritualistic breaking of this 
order – what we will hereafter term ‘transgressions’. These statutes prohibit certain actions 
until a certain date. The ‘transgressions’ ensure that the libertines will not do “certain things” 
before “the appointed time”.166 Paradoxically, this article of government determines what is 
initially illegal or taboo (implying the sovereigns transgressive “decision”) and then it seeks 
to overcome this restriction. The transgression is inscribed within the law itself, self-
reflexively concerning taboo and the authority to break the taboo. For example, there is a 
“schedule” established for the “deflorations”.167 Sade’s sovereigns announce: “…it has been 
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decided and planned that the eight maidenheads of the little girls’  cunts shall remain intact 
until the month of December, and their asses shall likewise remain in bond, as shall the asses 
of the eight little boys, until the month of January (il est décidé et arrangé que les huit 
pucelages des cons des jeunes filles ne seront enlevés que dans le mois de décembre, et ceux 
de leurs culs, ainsi que deux des culs des huit jeunes garçons, ne le seront que dans le cours 
de janvier)”. 168  Relatedly, the sovereigns are not allowed to have themselves “fucked” 
(foutre) until a certain point.
169
 These restrictions are only “forbidden” “until the moment” 
they are “embedded in the story”. 170  In a deliberately mathematical and power-driven 
approach to political relations, the sovereigns ascend in stature as the victims are degraded. 
Once a child is “initiated”, “it shall be available for every enjoyment, in all manners and all 
times (on pourra jouir de lui, quand et de quelle manière que l'on le voudra).”171 Robbed of 
any legal identity, to be used wholly at the whims of the ruling power, the sovereigns declare 
to the victims at Silling: “You are already dead to the world” (Déjà mortes au monde).172 
The claim here is that the third type of statute is the norm of Sade’s law. ‘Transgressions’ are 
the moral trajectory of the novel because this destructive logic is mirrored in the work’s 
extra-textual qualities which we outlined in the introduction.
173
 To be clear: all three types of 
law are ultimately grounded in the sovereign “decision” made prior to the “orgies”. The 
morale which we are uncovering in Sade’s law then, only occurs as a result of the sovereigns 
decision to form their isolated “society”. Sade explicitly states in his notes, this organisation 
is formed on the strength of “moral diatribe”. This morale is implied in the construction of 
the law. Therefore, there is a double transgressive movement in the third category. The 
statutes order the bacchanals, certainly, but also and more importantly for Sade’s philosophy, 
they dialectically provide the possibility of transgressing limits, engendering further pleasure 
through a further demonstration of power. In the course of the novel, these limitations are 
systematically destroyed. Sade is certain, “the value” is “set upon despotism”.174 This norm 
lurking within Sade’s law, is only a parody of normativity; this is a norm that contains and 
entails its own destruction – a norm founded on crime – like an ouroboros. Right from the 
off, Sade is embroiled in the key thematic of his law: infinitude and impossibility. At their 
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most extreme, the sovereigns possess infinite power, they crave impossible desires, housed in 
impossible conditions, where every whim, every decision, can be made regardless of the 
consent of those who are affected by those decisions.   
Infinite Transgression  
In this section of the thesis, we are discussing the possibility of infinite transgression as 
proposed by the moral trajectory of Sade’s novel. The term ‘possibility’ is key due to an 
immediate and recurrent problem in The 120 Days. Despite our claim for impossibility, some 
scholars, like Jane Gallop have argued that the four sovereigns do not purport this negative 
logic.
175
 As described, there are four sovereigns, not one, suggesting camaraderie. These four 
sovereigns preside over an entire society, formed from different ranks of power. The 
sustainment of that power clearly requires an agreement between the four sovereigns, 
otherwise their sovereignty would collapse. In other words, does the ordering of the statutes 
themselves prove the existence of fraternity and friendship within Sade’s fiction, thereby 
undermining our claim for limitless sovereignty? In the following pages of the thesis, we will 
argue against this position; Sade creates a figure under no restraints at all. Sade’s sovereignty 
concept does indeed ultimately collapse, constructing an immaculate project of self-
destruction. 
In his reading of sovereignty, Bodin is keen to stress the imprescriptibility of both divine and 
natural law, whilst Sade’s main objective is to “outrage the laws of both Nature and 
religion.”176 It is the very impossibility of these desires which drives the sovereigns. Upon not 
being satisfied by a particular victim he had taken, the Duc says warily to the other 
sovereigns, “You know to what we are led by a thwarted desire”177 They seek to continually 
attain what Schmitt entitles the “miracle” (Wunder) moment. In their desire to overcome 
divine restrictions, the sovereigns are “analogous to the omnipotent God”.178 Within this 
fictive space, Sade challenges the moral laws of Christianity as well as the physical laws of 
nature: his victims die impossibly long deaths, his sovereigns aspire to burn the world, to 
“dismember Nature and unhinge the universe”.179 A philosophy of ruin and cataclysm, Sade’s 
notes demonstrate that he is often unclear whether some characters are even alive at certain 
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points in the narrative.
180
 “Most infatuated with evil”, Sade’s severe atheism ensures that all 
things are permissible; he takes great pleasure in describing the violation of Christian 
taboos.
181
 As Kierkegaard states in The Sickness Unto Death (1849), the highest form of sin 
is the positive kind, declaring Christianity to be a lie implies the rejection of sin entirely.
182
 In 
Sade’s hands, the name of God becomes just another means of producing pleasure. The 
subjects are to have “no religion save that of blindly serving and obeying”.183  
Therefore, any agreement between the four sovereigns is temporary. Whilst it is true the 
sovereigns are obliged to follow the “statutes” initially, this commitment is rescinded by the 
end of the novel. In the final pages, the sovereigns, with a depleted stock of subjects, turn the 
upstairs chambers into a prison and destroy the last of the victims. The narrative stops 
abruptly with lists of the dead. The reader is asked to fill in the lost details: “With what 
regards the tortures and deaths of the last twenty subjects, and life such as it was in the 
household until the day of departure, you will give details (A l'égard et des supplices des 
vingt derniers sujets et de la vie qu'on mène jusqu'au départ, vous le détaillerez à votre 
aise)…sprinkle in whatever tortures you like (les supplices à votre choix).”184 In the end, the 
sovereigns break their statutes and destroy the last of the subjects. Hegel teaches us that “self-
consciousness” (Selbstbewußtsein) cannot exist without being “acknowledged” 
(Anerkanntes).
185
 Thus with no one left to subject, they are no longer sovereign. In his 
influential reading of Hegel, Alexandre Kojève writes that a dead human cannot acknowledge 
the triumph of the subjugator: “For the dead man is no longer anything more than an 
unconscious thing, from which the living man turns away in indifference, since he can no 
longer expect anything from it for himself.” 186  The sovereigns conclude their orgies, 
attempting the highest crime, the destruction of their own sovereignty. This brings the novel 
to a close and ends the juridical order. As Bodin states, only “self-destruction” (anéantie) 
ensures “the image of God” (l’image de Dieu) becomes “equal” (égal)  to the “subjects” 
(sujet).
187
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Thus, there may be an agreement, but it is not friendship: it is the obligation to be a 
sovereign. The statutes order the sovereigns domination of the victims; this initial agreement 
legislates their laws. Yet as Foucault also notes, when Sade’s characters are forced to accept 
order – figured in the text by “the statutes” – this is only an exercise in carrying sovereignty 
to a point where it is naught but “unique” and “naked”: “…an unlimited right of all-powerful 
monstrosity.”188  At the end of the book, the highest crime is attempted – the denial of 
sovereignty – the overturning of that contract. This process of self-destruction is the ultimate 
pleasure for the sovereigns; the definitive negation is their own sovereignty. For this is 
precisely why Bataille writes: “Denying others becomes in the end denying oneself.”189 The 
project of absolute sovereignty is ultimately self-destructive because it seeks to negate life 
itself. Hence the intensification and eventual disintegration of the novel. In the final “parts”, 
the tortures become more intense and the descriptions more barren. Gone are the lengthy 
narrative diatribes and in their place, recurring geometrical depictions of the victims’ death 
and mutilation. The concluding “passion” (passion), related by the “story-tellers” 
(historiennes), is a vision “of hell” (de l'enfer).190 The figure Sade presents seemingly endless 
attempts to sustain the “miracle” moment and become absolutely limitless: “He bleeds both 
of her arms and would have her remain standing while her blood flows; now and again he 
stops the bleeding and flogs her, then he opens the wounds again, and this continues until she 
collapses. He only discharges when she faints (Il la saigne des deux bras, et veut qu'elle soit 
debout quand le sang coule; de temps à autre, il arrête le sang pour la fouetter; ensuite il 
rouvre les plaies, et le tout jusqu'à l'évanouissement. Il ne décharge que quand elle 
tombe).”191     
The figure Sade entertains the possibility of an ultimate crime, producing the ultimate 
pleasure. Like Schmitt, Sade saw political power in the desire for the infinite. The sovereigns 
dream of the impossible – the destruction of existence as such: “…my imagination has 
always outdistanced my faculties (j'avoue que mon imagination a toujours été sur cela au- 
delà de mes moyens)…Ah how many times, by God, have I not longed to be able to assail the 
sun (attaquer le soleil), snatch it out of the universe, make a general darkness, or use that star 
to burn the world (embraser le monde)”.192 At its most extreme therefore, this philosophy 
denies life as such – a task only possible in art. As Bataille writes on this development of 
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impossibility: “…an attitude of utter irresponsibility [that] ends with…stringent self-
control…the peak that sovereignty can attain.”193 An entirely ruinous approach to philosophy, 
Sade reveals the “infinite possibilities of literature”, constructing a figure subject to no 
restraints of any kind.
194
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Summary 
This second chapter of the thesis has argued that Sade’s conception of transgression in The 
120 Days of Sodom extends the principle of absolute sovereignty to its unlimited ends. As we 
saw in the first section, Sade situates his novel in the 1710’s at the decline of King Louis 
XIV’s reign. This rule was dominated by the philosophy of Jean Bodin, whose principle of 
“absolute sovereignty” was used to legitimise the despotism of the seventeenth century 
French aristocracy. In late eighteenth century France, critiques of this absolute monarchy 
were commonplace. Bodin argued that sovereignty is perpetual and absolute. The attributes 
of sovereignty are inalienable and unique to the sovereign. The encompassing quality of 
absolute sovereignty is the power to make and unmake laws, regardless of consent from the 
subjects. Thus, the absolute sovereign is a figure outside the law, who determines the law, but 
is not bound by any of its dictums. As Schmitt writes, it the rule of the “exception” that is the 
true mark of sovereign power.    
In the second section, we examined the notion of transgressive law in Sade’s novel. As we 
saw, it is the statutes which provide the impetus behind Sade’s transgressions; their 
unravelling constructs the novel’s entire narrative development. The statutes provide a 
medium for the domination of the subjects by the sovereigns. This association consolidates 
their sovereign power. However, the agreement is negated – like all else – at the end. This is 
because of the basic dictum of the figure Sade: to commit the ultimate crime for the ultimate 
pleasure. This contract represents the sovereigns’ obligation to sovereignty, used to mediate 
the suppression of the subjects and offer the possibility of an ultimate crime. For whilst the 
statutes establish ordered limitations, the figure Sade presented in his fiction, sees an 
opportunity to destroy a further restriction.  
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Conclusion 
See, then, that I, I am He  
There is no God beside Me 
I deal death and give life 
I wound and I will heal: from My hand none can deliver 
Lo, I raise My hand to heaven  
And say: ‘As I Live forever’  
 
[Deuteronomy 32: 39-40]  
 
In the first chapter we introduced the paradox of sovereign power as described by Carl 
Schmitt. Following Schmitt, we have seen that sovereignty, a “secularised” (säkularisierte) 
theological concept, is determined by being the exception to the rule. Sovereign is he or she 
who retains the capacity to transgress and reaffirm the legal order. With the aim of sustaining 
the legal order as a whole, the sovereign can do what the subjects cannot. This is not 
necessarily an exceptional occurrence, we regularly permit the state to kill on our behalf, for 
example. Yet in an “emergency”, when the security of the state is severely threatened, the 
sovereign’s rights are similarly extended ad infinitum. The problem of sovereignty is that in 
this transgression, the sovereign exists both inside and outside the law. The sovereign is the 
law-maker, determining juridical limits, but is ultimately not bound to the law that is ordered.  
In ‘theological’ societies, the “miracle” (Wunder) of going beyond the legal order was 
considered a gift from the divine. Ancient political leaders were regarded as demigods, their 
absolute authority was a sacred force never to be doubted. In a theological context, the law 
and its authority emerge concomitantly; there is no separation between the norm and the 
exceptional law-maker, because “what the prince wills has the force of law” (quod principi 
placet vigorem legis habet).
195
 In a modern and secular context, however, the paradox of 
sovereign power emerges as a problem. Driven by fear for the security of the state, a rupture 
emerges between the sovereign and the juridical norm. Schmitt states that in the state of the 
exception, the sovereign’s capacity to suspend law is “necessarily unlimited” (notwendig 
unbegrenzt).  In “emergencies”, a violence grows without reference point because “necessity 
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has no law” (necessitas non habet legem). Thus, God’s vacated space ensures that at the heart of 
modern sovereign power, lies an originary indistinction between violence and law. This is not 
a violence of passion, but cold bureaucratic ‘need’.  
In the first section of the second chapter, we provided a short history of The 120 Days of 
Sodom and its scholarship, leading to an exegesis of the novel’s setting. In the second section, 
we were concerned with the presentation of absolute sovereignty offered in The 120 Days. 
We analysed the implied morale proposed by Sade’s law. Working from the conceptual 
framework informed by Schmitt from the preceding chapter, this second section made 
evident the centrality of law in Sade’s fictive universe. The narrative of The 120 Days is 
defined by the establishment of a juridical order, the libertines “decide” (décident) to form a 
“society” (société). These laws (lois) – named “Statutes” (règlement) in the text – establish a 
destructive and negative logic which we unpicked. It was argued that Sade’s law seeks after 
nothing save its own destruction, an impossible task. We saw that Sade extends this 
destructive principle to its absolute ends. Sade’s novel is structured by the making of law, the 
sustaining of that law, and its consequent transgression and violation. Sade accelerates the 
problem of sovereignty; law is paradoxically determined by that which has the capacity to 
suspend and transgress the juridical order. Whilst Bodin declares that the sovereign has but 
two “limitations” (limites) to his “absolute” (absolue) and “perpetual” (perpétuelle) “power” 
(puissance): “the laws of God and Nature” (la loi naturelle et divine). Sade seeks to destroy 
even these restrictions, outraging “the laws of both nature and religion”.196   
We have seen in this thesis that The 120 Days of Sodom disrupts the “borderline idea” 
(Grenzbegriff) of sovereignty, exposing the fragile boundaries between legality and illegality, 
crime and law, abuser and victim. As argued, Sade’s primary contribution to the problem of 
sovereignty lies with his concept of transgression in The 120 Days of Sodom. Transgression 
as the normative trajectory of Sade’s novel accelerates and exhausts the problem of 
sovereignty, necessitating the perpetual breaking of limitations, a desire for the infinite. The 
figure Sade presents in The 120 Days seeks to rise above all legal ordo. The sovereigns at 
Silling have unquenchable thirst, dismantling relations only to find a further unity to destroy. 
For the sovereigns, crime does not exist, everything is permitted, all is possible. Whilst we 
subjects see restrictions, the sovereigns at Silling see a further opportunity to demonstrate 
their majesty. Yet what can transgression truly mean for the sovereigns, who do not accept 
any restriction? Crime is denied, yet, at the same time, it also provides the one sole pleasure 
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for the sovereign law-makers. Transgression involves the breaking of law, to improve it or 
violate it irrespectively, but if the sovereigns do not accept law, then what is transgressed? 
Transgression is the means through which Sade can reveal power in its bare naked form. Sade 
reveals the fully realised paradox of sovereignty as a contradiction between transgression and 
the desire for infinite power. The highest power lies with the sovereign, the one who decides, 
the law-maker. This power is exercised through the overcoming of limitations. Sovereign is 
he or she who is ‘exceptional’, who overcomes juridical delimitations, existing both inside 
and outside the law. Sovereignty is paradoxical because it involves both the institution of the 
juridical order and the denial of that order. Sade accelerates this paradox, exclusively 
emphasising the transgressive capacity of sovereign power – the contradiction in terms of a 
‘legitimate transgression’. Sade’s sovereigns are driven by incredible desires of infinite 
variety, they remark that “it is truly impossible to guess how far a man may go in this 
direction, provided he be ashamed of nothing.”197 Their goal is to have a “heart” which does 
not “recognise virtue”.198  The subjects are to be degraded until death. Sade heralds this 
reduction to victimhood: “Feeble, enfettered creatures destined solely for our pleasures…you 
must expect naught but humiliation, and obedience is that one virtue whose use I recommend 
to you…Give a thought to your circumstance…You are enclosed  in an impregnable citadel; 
no one on earth knows you are here; you are beyond the reach of your friends, of your kin; 
insofar as the world is concerned, you are already dead to the world… (Êtres faibles et 
enchaînés, uniquement destinés à nos plaisirs...des esclaves, vous ne devez-vous attendre 
qu'à l'humiliation...Examinez votre situation...Vous êtes enfermées dans une citadelle 
impénétrable; qui que ce soit ne vous y sait; vous êtes soustraites à vos amis, à vos parents, 
vous êtes déjà mortes au mondes...).”199  
In the final “parts”, The 120 Days exhibits the unadulterated structure of the sovereign 
decision. The normative aspects of Silling are systematically discounted, until the subjects are 
reduced to nothing but mere statistical lists of the dead. With inexorable precision, Sade 
marches his sovereigns toward the decisive transgression, destroying their own power, 
overcoming their own sovereignty. Here, the unbearable tension, a product of their 
impossible desires, can at last be neutralised and returned to its original equilibrium. 
Repeating Bodin’s testament, the process of making the subjects at Silling to the sovereigns, 
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involves cataclysm and self-destruction. Since the sovereigns of Silling stand perpetually 
outside the law, they ultimately negate themselves. As such, the sovereigns destroy the 
remaining citizens and in so doing, their own sovereignty. The previously divisible qualities 
of life at Silling, the even numbers through which the sovereigns exercise power, have been 
reduced to zero. Indeed, the sudden end of the novel itself demonstrates that the work cannot 
sustain the destruction of its own purpose.  
The purpose of The 120 Days of Sodom is to extend the principle of absolute sovereignty to 
its necessarily destructive ends. According to Schmitt, the principle of absolute sovereignty is 
the rule of the exception; the absolute sovereign decides the law, but he also exists outside its 
authority. This means that the sovereign has the right to enforce law regardless of the 
subject’s consent. Indeed, as Bodin concludes, the only limitations that can be placed upon 
the absolute sovereign are the laws of “God” and “Nature”. The four sovereigns’ of The 120 
Days of Sodom however, extend the principle of absolute sovereignty to its extreme; they 
seek to destroy even these constraints. The sovereigns’ dream of the impossible, committing 
the ultimate crime and becoming absolutely limitless. ‘The figure’ Sade desires to transcend 
all restrictions. In their attempt to inhabit absolute negation, the sovereigns’ aspire to destroy 
existence as such, a claim only possible in art. The law of the exception therefore, when taken 
to its ultimate, results in self-destruction.  
Conclusively, by turning transgression (the outside) into the norm (the inside), Sade turns the 
very dialectics of sovereignty inside out. In Bodin, Hobbes and Schmitt, sovereign power is 
examined from the view of a subject. They enquire as to how sovereign law obligates both 
themselves and the wider population. In The 120 Days, conversely, sovereign power is 
exclusively understood as the violence unleashed beyond the law. This is fitting for a man 
who deifies the torturer in the language of the repressed. Sade creates an impossible universe 
wherein the transgressive decision becomes a permanently manifest law. Emergencies 
authorise the sovereign decision to legitimately suspend and transgress the normative legal 
order. Sade’s novel shows that this suspension exceeds moral experience. The legitimacy of 
the decision is always grounded in a theological space prior to normative considerations; it 
refuses to recognise the habitual hallmarks which characterise an ethic: otherness, 
togetherness, mutual exchange or reciprocity. The 120 Days is a novel structured by this 
compulsion, the desire for power beyond order – the greater the suspension of law, the 
greater the violence and the higher the pleasure. It is, of course, impossible to be without 
restriction. We know of no human being who has lived without law and we know of no 
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society without rule. Yet in Sade’s fictive space, he details no bounds whatsoever. Sade 
attempts to see political power in its purest, most singular form. As Bataille writes, Sade’s 
greatest truth was in pushing ‘the destructive element to its logical conclusion’.200 
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